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Abstract
This paper presents a novel method for the secure management of digital ima-
ges formulated within the mathematical theory of polynomial interpolation. As
main innovative features, our approach is based on a hierarchical joint ownership
of the image by a trusted layered authority and on a deterministic watermarking
procedure, embedding a short meaningful or random signature into the image.
Experimental results show that the inserted signature can almost always be fully
recovered even in presence of a reasonable amount of image degradation due to
image processing operators, such as filtering, geometric distorsions and compres-
sion.
1. Introduction
In the last decade, digital watermarking techniques have raised a great deal of
interest in the scientific community since the pioneering contribution by Cox et
al. [1]. Indeed, the practice of imperceptible alteration of a document to embed
a message into it plays a key role in the challenging field of ownership right pro-
tection. Much progress has been done in the last few years (see for instance [2]),
but no general solution has been reached so far. This can be explained by several
different factors, among which the heterogeneity of the requirements imposed by
each application context and the clear definition and the operational mechanisms
of the authority that would deal with the ownership verification process. In other
words, currently proposed watermarking techniques strongly depend on the appli-
cation scenario.
Let us consider the specific case, where a public or private organization needs
to keep control on internal resources distributed to a number of users. In such
a context, the organization can be regarded as an authority which has free ac-
cess to the original data and assigns watermarked copies to users, who ignore the
presence of the watermark. A realistic example of such an application scenario
is provided by the distribution of uniquely identifiable copies of a confidential
British cabinet document to each minister by Margaret Thatcher in 1981. Hence,
when the document was printed in the newspapers, the source of the leak could
be discovered ([3], p. 4). More generally, the two main ingredients of this kind of
copyright management scheme are: i) a joint ownership of the original data in a
group with hierarchical structure; and ii) a watermarking procedure which can ex-
ploit the original data in the reconstruction phase (i.e., it is not necessarily blind)
and whose existence is hidden to users (i.e., it is steganographic according to the
terminology of [3]).
The first issue, i.e., the hierarchical ownership handling, has been recently
addressed in the context of digital image watermarking by Guo and Georganas
[4], whose work exploits a secret sharing procedure generalizing the basic scheme
by Shamir [5]. A 
	 -threshold sharing scheme allows to divide a secret into
	 shares and requires the knowledge of at least  out of 	 shares to reconstruct
the original content. Each share does not carry any meaningful partial plaintext of
the secret and, if the number of shares available is less than  , a potential attacker
can do no better than guessing, even with infinite computing time and power.
Nevertheless, the solution in [4] has the annoying drawback that the procedure of
shares distribution is expensive in terms of storage and complexity, since a huge
number of shares is assigned to each participant. For a critical analysis of this
algorithm, we refer to [6].
As an alternative, in this paper we propose a more sophisticated approach
based on Birkhoff polynomial interpolation. Its main advantage is that the secret
sharing is simplified by assigning just a single real number to each member of the
group (no matter how complicated the corresponding access structure). We also
propose a novel deterministic approach to steganographic image watermarking,
requiring exact reconstruction of the signature (watermark) assigned to each user.
Instead of considering a long random sequence as watermark and just a correlation
measure for its detection as in [1], here a short meaningful or random signature
is embedded and the watermark detection consists in a perfect recovery of the
inserted signature.
Specifically, the signature written in English alphabet is first translated into a
sequence of integers by means of a look-up table. Such a sequence of integers is
used to set the coefficients of a trigonometric polynomial, from which a predefined
number of samples is extracted evaluated at equally spaced points. Finally, the
values of the samples are embedded into the lowest frequency coefficients of the
original image transformed into the DCT domain (excluding the DC component as
in [1]). The watermark extraction process is based on solving a system of linear
equations defined by the recovered samples. It is worth mentioning that, in [7]
and [8], an analogous sinusoidal pattern has already been successfully exploited
to embed a pseudo-random sequence. In these works, however, the detection of
the watermark was just limited to a correlation measurement. In our watermark-
ing scheme, characterized by a full reconstruction of the watermark, the choice
of a trigonometric rather than an algebraic polynomial is motivated by the fact
that standard polynomial interpolation is ill-conditioned, while the use of trigono-
metric functions allows to keep the condition number of the corresponding linear
system close to the optimal value  . As customary in watermarking applications,
we require our scheme to be robust against standard image processing operators,
such as various filters, geometric distorsions and compression. In order to obtain
a reliable deterministic polynomial reconstruction, we need to face the problem of
image degradations due to the application of such operators. Despite the preser-
vation of the global quality of the image, the degradation may drastically corrupt
some entries of the DCT image where the watermark is inserted. We overcome
this issue by a suitable selection of the DCT samples conveying the watermark. In
order to assess the effectiveness of the proposed watermarking approach, based on
a hierarchical authority of ownership verification, we make use of a very large set
of test images of different typologies. The obtained results show that our method
exhibits a satisfactory effectiveness: the signature is reconstructed with  of
accuracy for a wide range of image degradation operators.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we present a hierarchical
secret sharing scheme for the joint ownership of the original image; in Section 3,
we describe the generation, the embedding and the reconstruction phases of the
watermarking scheme; in Section 4, we report experimental results; and in Sec-
tion 5, we draw some concluding remarks.
2. Hierarchical joint ownership
2.1. Previous work
The main feature of a nonblind watermarking scheme is that the original image
is needed in the reconstruction phase. As a consequence, an authority group 
managing this process has to memorize the cover image, preferably storing it in a
distributed (e.g., hierarchical) way for security reasons. As mentioned in the pre-
vious Section, in order to do that it is natural to apply a secret sharing procedure.
In this context, the basic secret sharing scheme proposed by Shamir [5] relies
on standard Lagrange polynomial interpolation. In greater detail, his idea consists
simply to identify a secret  with some coefficients of a polynomial
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is a so-called Vandermonde matrix ([9], p. 155). It follows that the linear system
(3) is determinated, i.e., it admits a unique solution, if and only if DFEG . In
particular, at least  out of 	 shares are needed to reconstruct  , hence we obtain
a 
	H -secret sharing scheme.
As pointed out in [5], a hierarchical variant can be introduced by simply as-
signing a higher number of shares to higher level participants. In the context of
digital image watermarking, a rather involved hierarchical secret sharing scheme
was proposed by Guo and Georganas [4], as already pointed out in the Introduc-
tion. More recently, a refined hierarchical scheme was obtained by Tassa [10]
from subtler properties of Birkhoff polynomial interpolation and improved fur-
ther in [11] for application to wireless ad hoc networks. Here we are going to
adapt from finite fields to real numbers this last approach, which seems to be
more efficient (assigning just one share to each member) and realistic (attributing
a qualitative rather than a quantitative difference between distinct levels). In the
following we will detail the proposed hierarchical joint ownership approach.
2.2. Proposed methodology
Let  be the authority group composed of 	 participants and let us consider a
collection I of subsets of  , which is monotone in the sense that if < JI then
any set containing
<
also belongs to I . A threshold secret sharing scheme with
access structure I is a method of sharing a secret among the members of  , in
such a way that only subsets in I can recover the secret, while all other subsets
have no information about it. Assume that  is divided into KMLN levels, i.e.,
OﬁQPSRTU#%$

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"%V
W1XﬁZY for every 6\[ﬁF/ . In order to reconstruct the secret,
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hierarchical threshold secret sharing scheme distributes to each participant a share
of a given secret  , in such a way that
I`ﬁba
<Nc
Cdfehg
<
VFi
P
"
Tj#%$ 
Tlkm
En
"No
6pﬁ(q)*))*rKs (5)
Roughly speaking, a subset of partecipants can reconstruct the secret if and only
if it contains at least  $ members of level  ; at least    members of level  and/or
level  ; at least   members of level  and/or  and/or t ; and so on.
In order to construct a suitable  $ )*))*]
R_^
	 -hierarchical threshold secret
sharing scheme for the joint ownership of the original image, it is natural to ap-
ply Birkhoff interpolation [12] instead of Lagrange interpolation [13]. In fact,
the Birkhoff scheme involves not only the polynomial, but also its (higher order)
derivatives. More precisely, let uQﬁNvu
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 , be a set of z
distinct interpolation points. For polynomials of degree 4Q~5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forward to deduce that a Birkhoff interpolation problem can admit infinitely many
solutions even if the number of equations equals the number of unknowns, i.e.
zﬁQ . Indeed, for instance, let us consider the case in which u
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	 . In such a case, the interpolation system involves only derivatives
of the polynomial  , hence it keeps no track of the constant term
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mains undetermined. More generally, elementary linear algebra considerations
show that if the interpolation matrix uﬁu
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does not satisfy the following Po´lya condition ([12], p. 126)
e

u
"xw
1WﬁQd/4nEnL54n4|{~ (7)
then the corresponding Birkhoff interpolation problem admits infinitely many so-
lutions.
The idea now is to exploit this necessary condition in order to ensure that only
authorized subsets can reconstruct the secret. Intuitively speaking, an evaluation
of the polynomial itself carries more informations than an evaluation of any of its
derivatives since it involves more coefficients; therefore it sounds reasonable to
assign to a participant of higher level the evaluation of a lower order derivative.
More precisely, we propose the following algorithm:
1. Associate to the original image a secret key  identified with a sequence
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In order to reconstruct the secret key  , the members of < have to solve the
following linear system1:
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in the unknowns
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The key point is that (10) is a Birkhoff interpolation problem with associated
interpolation matrix uX´bﬁ u
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In the following, we will provide two theorems that represent the theoretical
framework for the secret reconstruction. Both theorems are based on the fact that
<
ÁI if and only if uX´ satisfies the Po´lya condition.
Theorem 1. If <ÂÃI then < cannot reconstruct the secret  .
Proof. Since <GÂÄI , u§´ doesn’t satisfies Po´lya condition and it follows that the
corresponding Birkhoff interpolation problem admits infinitely many solutions.
Thus < cannot reconstruct the secret.
Moreover, we can apply Theorem 10.1 in [12], p.128, whose statement can be
rephrased as follows:
Proposition 1. A Birkhoff interpolation problem admits a unique solution for al-
most all choices of interpolation points    *))) r , i. e. outside of a subset of  
with z -dimensional measure zero, if and only if it satisfies the Po´lya condition.
1We observe that one can improve the numerical stability of the linear system (10) with a care-
ful choice of the random points Å*Æ¿ÇÉÈÈÉÈÉÇÅ]Ê . Indeed, it is well known that interpolation problems
are usually ill conditioned and Chebyshev points represent the optimal choice as interpolation
nodes ([13], Ë 5). In order to obtain random points, just consider a small random perturbation of
Chebyshev points.
Hence our random selection of the interpolation points allows us to deduce the
following:
Theorem 2. If < ÃI then < recovers the secret  .
Proof. Since < ÃI , uX´ satisfies Po´lya condition and with a random selection of
interpolation points it is possible to apply Proposition 1. Thus the unique solution
of the Birkhoff interpolation problem conveys the secret: 
"
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&
"
for 6¡4²¢4
~ .
As a consequence, a set of participants can reconstruct the original image and
verify the presence of the watermark if and only if it belongs to the predefined
access structure.
3. The watermarking scheme
The aim of an authority  hierarchically organized into several levels is to dis-
tribute a given image Ì among a set of users Í
 
))*)*
Í
-
, keeping some control on
the use of the image by each of them. In particular, for any copy of Ì , that may
undergo some image processing operations, any subset <Nc  in the given access
structure I should be able to identify without ambiguity the user this copy comes
from. As summarized in Figure 1, a secure management of Ì can be provided by
the following procedure:
1. Fix
¶
`Î not exceeding the number of pixels of Ì .
2. Apply the DCT to Ì and consider a ¯W submatrix ÏﬁNÐÏ
"xw
1  corresponding
to the lowest frequency DCT coefficients.
3. Put the entries of Ï , but Ï $
w
$ , into a vector bﬁ7
&
$
))),
&
   , where ¢µﬁ


~ (the DC component is not used in the watermarking procedure).
4. Distribute  among all members of the group according to the rules de-
scribed in the Section 2, in such a way that only certain distinguished sub-
groups can recover  in order to use Ì in the watermarking reconstruction
phase.
3.1. Watermark generation
In our watermarking scheme, the watermark consists in a sequence of letters as-
signed to each user. Such a signature can be either random or meaningful accord-
ing to the authority requirements. Since we assume that the authority desires a
full reconstruction of the watermark, we exploit again a polynomial framework as
it will be described in the next subsections. In order to avoid numerical stability
problems, that may appear in the watermark reconstruction phase if polynomials
present big coefficients, we minimize the moduli of the numbers involved. Ac-
cording to a statistical analysis of the letters in the English dictionary [14], we
construct a look-up table based on the principle that the more frequent a letter in
the set of English words, the smaller the integer associated to it, so that the norm
of the signature is kept as small as possible.
3.2. Watermark embedding
As illustrated in Figure 2, for all users ÍÑ , ½4yÒª4Q	 , with signature D Ñ   )*))*]D Ñ
T
,
an authorized subset < ÁI performs the following procedure:
1. Consider the trigonometric polynomial2

Ñ
Kﬂﬁ
T
! "
#
 
D
Ñ
"ÔÓrÕlÖ
v6×
$
K (12)
where × $  is a constant radian frequency.
2As already mentioned in the Introduction, standard polynomial interpolation is ill-
conditioned, while trigonometric functions allow to solve linear systems with condition number
closer to Ø .
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3. Watermark Ì by substituting every Ï
"xw
1 with Ï
"lw
1íÐLî¯è
Ñ
"xw
1
 , where înï
is a scaling factor, small enough to make the watermarked image Ì Ñ percep-
tually indistinguishable from Ì .
3.3. Watermark reconstruction
Let the image Ì Ñ be the watermarked copy of Ì given to the user Í Ñ , ð4 Ò4
	 , possibly decayed. In order to identify Í Ñ , an authorized subset < NI first
reconstructs  by solving the linear system (10), puts it into a matrix and recovers
Ï . Then, for each user ÍñÑ , 4ZÒ4Z	 , with signature D Ñ   )*))*]D Ñ
T
,
<
performs the
following procedure (see Figure 3):
1. Apply the DCT transform to Ì Ñ and consider its  submatrix Ï ÑMﬁÀÐÏ Ñ
"xw
1

corresponding to the lowest frequency DCT coefficients.
2. Define òbﬁNvò
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 by setting
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where è Ñ is computed as in 3.1.2.
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sponding to the least corrupted entries and let KﬂﬁQ .
4. If e{ôõK 8 © , conclude that the signature of ÍÑ is not present in Ì Ñ . Other-
wise, compute á again as in 3.1.2 and solve the following linear system
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in the unknowns D Ñ   )*))*]D ÑT and round the obtained solution to the closest
string of integers.
5. If the signature of ÍñÑ is recovered with ë of accuracy, then stop the pro-
cedure keeping track of the number e{ôõK . Otherwise, reduce the thresh-
old K of a t factor and go to Step 4. Notice that only a finite number of
repetitions of Step 4 is needed in order to conclude one way or another since
e{ôõK decreases with K .
6. Finally, < I associates Ì Ñ to the user Í Ñ for which the signature has
been fully reconstructed. In case of conflicts, i.e., when it comes out that
several different signatures are fully reconstructed from Ì Ñ , < compares the
different values of e{ôõK of the corresponding users and associates Ì Ñ to
the user Í Ñ showing the highest e¡ôõK .
4. Experimental results
In this experimental phase, we implemented our watermarking approach setting
×
$
ﬁ(t.à ,
¶
ﬁZëú , îÃﬁnq)l and tested it on a set of ûí images of different nature to
deduce meaningful conclusions. In general, the watermark inserted in the image
is imperceptible since on average PSNR ﬁ üý dB (see Figures 4 and 5). The
attacks we considered to verify the method robustness are the following standard
image degradation operations: additive white Gaussian noise with power ë dB;
additive uniform noise with variance equal to 12; ýX¡ý moving average; Gaussian
lowpass filtering of size ý9ý with standard deviation q)jþ ; rotation in a counter-
clockwise direction of at most )ßþ degree using the nearest neighbor interpolation
method; resizing to various dimensions (down to one per cent of the original image
area) using the nearest neighbor interpolation method; JPEG compression with
quality factor down to tþ  . For all these attacks, we tried to reconstruct the
inserted signature with ë of accuracy according to two different experimental
scenarios.
The first scenario intends to test the possibility of applying the method in-
dependently of the image characteristics. This was done by inserting the same
signature on the 70 available different images. The obtained results are summa-
rized in Table 1 with the signature chosen as DITUNITN. In this table, we report
the average probability of success (PS), the average and the minimal numbers of
samples selected for watermark reconstruction (mean e{ô and min e{ô , respec-
tively). The obtained results demonstrate that the method is image independent.
The embedded signature is recovered with ë of accuracy for each image with
a very high number of samples.
The second scenario aims at assessing the sensitivity of the method to the
choice of the signature used to watermark the image. This was carried out by con-
sidering two images of different typologies like the Lena and Baboon images (see
Figures 4 and 5, respectively) distributed among û  users to which random signa-
tures were associated. For the two images, the quantitative results are reported in
Table 2 and 3, respectively. The watermarked Lena and Baboon images respond
very well to all attacks for every signature inserted. In addition, we report for
each attack also the plots showing the number of samples found for each signa-
ture (see Figures 6 and 7). In all cases, a peak identifies the true inserted signature
corresponding to position 35 in the plots.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a novel image watermarking technique which al-
lows a trusted authority to recover the ownership from any reasonably decayed
copy of an image distributed to several users. In order to do so, we embed into
the image the signature of the corresponding user in a redundant way, exploiting a
suitable trigonometric polynomial. The watermark detection is performed by the
authority, which is considered as a hierarchical group managing the original image
with a generalized secret sharing scheme based on Birkhoff polynomial interpola-
tion. From the experimental results, it emerges that a perfect reconstruction of the
signature can almost always be obtained for several kinds of image degradation
operators independently of the image characteristics and signature used. Future
work will concern the possibility of designing a non steganographic version of our
watermarking method. The possibility of designing a blind version will be also
investigated.
References
[1] I. J. Cox, J. Kilian, F. T. Leighton, and T. Shamoon. Secure Spread Spectrum
Watermarking for Multimedia. IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, Vol.
6, No. 12, 1997, 1673–1687.
[2] Joachim Eggers and Bernd Girod. Informed Watermarking. Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Norwell, MA, USA, 2002.
[3] I. J. Cox, M. L. Miller, and J. A. Bloom. Digital Watermarking. Academic
Press, London, 2002.
[4] H. Guo and N. D. Georganas. A Novel Approach to Digital Image Watermark-
ing Based on a Generalized Secret Sharing Scheme.Multimedia Systems, Vol.
9, No. 3, 2003, 249–260.
[5] A. Shamir. How to Share a Secret. Communication of the ACM 22 (1979),
612–613.
[6] Y. Wu. Dynamic Ownership Verification. 4th IEEE Pacific-Rim Conference
on Multimedia, Track 2B2.7, CD-ROM, ISBN 0-7803-8186-6, Singapore,
December 2003.
[7] H. Choi, H. Kim, and T. Kim. Robust Sinusoidal Watermark for Images.
Electronics Letters, Vol. 35, No. 15, 1999, 1238–1239.
[8] Z. Liu and A. Inoue. Audio Watermarking Techniques Using Sinusoidal Pat-
terns Based on Pseudorandom Sequences. IEEE Transactions on Circuits and
Systems for Video Technology, Vol. 13, No. 8, 2003, 801–812.
[9] S. Lang. Linear Algebra. Third Edition, Springer, 1987.
[10] T. Tassa. Hierarchical Threshold Secret Sharing. Proc. of the Theory of
Cryptography Conference 2004, MIT, Cambridge MA, USA, February 2004,
LNSC 2951, Springer-Verlag, 2004, 473–490.
[11] E. Ballico, G. Boato, C. Fontanari, and F. Granelli. Multi-
path Secret Sharing in Ad Hoc Networks: a Hierarchical Approach
via Birkhoff Interpolation. Technical Report DIT-04-080, Diparti-
mento di Informatica e Telecomunicazioni, University of Trento, 2004
(http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00000682/).
[12] R. A. DeVore and G. G. Lorentz. Constructive Approximation. Grundlehren
der Mathematischen Wissenschaften 303, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1993.
[13] J.-P. Berrut and L. N. Trefethen. Barycentric Lagrange Interpolation. Siam
Review, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2004, 501–517.
[14] http://www.askoxford.com/asktheexperts/faq/aboutwords/frequency
List of Figures
Fig. 1. Block diagram illustrating the hierarchical distribution process of
the original image.
Fig. 2. Block diagram showing the various steps occurring in the watermark
embedding process.
Fig. 3. Block diagram of the watermark reconstruction process.
Fig. 4. Original (a) and watermarked (b) Lena image (PSNR ﬁ(üý})j  ).
Fig. 5. Original (a) and watermarked (b) Baboon image (PSNR ﬁ(üt})  ).
Fig. 6. Number of samples found versus signature for Lena image after: (a)
additive white Gaussian noise; (b) additive uniform noise; (c) ýý moving
average; (d) Gaussian lowpass filtering; (e) scaling with a factor of 0.1; (f)
rotation of 1.5 degrees; (g) JPEG compression with quality factor equal to
25%.
Fig. 7. Number of samples found versus signature for Baboon image after:
(a) additive white Gaussian noise; (b) additive uniform noise; (c) ýÃý
moving average; (d) Gaussian lowpass filtering; (e) scaling with a factor of
0.1; (f) rotation of 1.5 degrees; (g) JPEG compression with quality factor
equal to 25%.
List of Tables
Table 1. Results obtained for the first experimental scenario (fixed mean-
ingful signature embedded into 70 different images).
Table 2. Results obtained in the second experimental scenario for the Lena
image by embedding 70 different random signatures.
Table 3. Results obtained in the second experimental scenario for the Ba-
boon image by embedding 70 different random signatures.
Image
Original DCT 
Setting of
polynomial
coefficients
Computation
of
derivatives
points assigned to
each member of the 
Evaluation on random
authority
Shares
distibution
Fig. 1.
Image
 Original
DCT Fusion
DCT 
WatermarkedInverse
Image
matrixsample
PolynomialTrigonometric
polynomialSignature
Fig. 2.
         
 
   
Shares
Original
image
recomposition
original image
 Watermarked Comparison
Received
image
Sample
Selection
Signature
reconstruction
DECISION
COMPARISON
Reduce threshold
value 
Signature
Fig. 3.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
100
150
200
250
(a) (b)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
100
150
200
250
(c) (d)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
(e) (f)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
100
150
200
250
(g)
Fig. 6.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
100
150
200
250
(a) (b)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
100
150
200
250
(c) (d)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
(e) (f)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
100
150
200
250
(g)
Fig. 7.
Table 1.
attack PS mean e{ô min e{ô
add. gauss. noise 100% 205 96
add. unif. noise 100% 194 84
moving average 100% 103 51
gaussian lpf 100% 206 124
resizing (0.1) 100% 134 80
rotation (1.5) 100% 67 46
JPEG (25%) 100% 154 69
Table 2.
attack PS mean e{ô min e{ô
add. gauss. noise 100% 201 46
add. unif. noise 100% 201 181
moving average 99% 126 61
gaussian lpf 100% 200 192
resizing (0.1) 100% 178 87
rotation (1.5) 99% 54 8
JPEG (25%) 100% 175 27
Table 3.
attack PS mean  min 
add. gauss. noise 100% 170 41
add. unif. noise 100% 163 32
moving average 100% 120 16
gaussian lpf 100% 193 191
resizing (0.1) 100% 86 11
rotation (1.5) 99% 55 11
JPEG (25%) 100% 82 10
